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Windsor, Shelby County, and the Demise of Originalism: 
A Personal Account 
DAWN JOHNSEN* 
By the final day of the Supreme Court’s 2012–2013 Term, when the Court 
issued decisions in challenges to two laws that discriminated against same-sex 
marriages,1 a remarkable consensus anticipated essentially the outcomes 
announced. Court watchers expected that Justice-in-the-middle Anthony Kennedy 
would lead the Court cautiously toward protecting against sexual orientation 
discrimination and, in any event, would not set back the cause of marriage equality 
by upholding either law. Although a substantial and passionate minority of the U.S. 
population continued to oppose the ability of gays and lesbians to marry, by June 6, 
2013, the issue’s eventual resolution seemed quite clear and few believed that the 
Court would put itself on the “wrong side” of that history.2 
A closely divided Court in United States v. Windsor met these expectations by 
declaring unconstitutional the section of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) that 
limited marriage for federal law purposes to a man and woman.3 A different five-
Justice majority in Hollingsworth v. Perry declined to reach the constitutionality of 
similar discrimination in a state law, California’s Proposition 8, by finding that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing.4 The two decisions, in effect, ended more than one 
thousand forms of federal discrimination against married same-sex couples5 and, by 
allowing the Perry district court ruling to stand, made California the thirteenth 
state, plus the District of Columbia, to permit same-sex couples to marry. More 
than thirty-eight percent of the U.S. population now lives in jurisdictions where 
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 1. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 
2652 (2013). 
 2. In 2013, for the first time a slight majority of Americans supported the legality of 
same-sex marriage. In Gay Marriage Debate, Both Supports and Opponents See Legal 
Recognition as ‘Inevitable’, PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS (June 6, 
2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/06/06/in-gay-marriage-debate-both-supporters-and
-opponents-see-legal-recognition-as-inevitable/ [hereinafter PEW POLL] (finding 51% support 
and 42% opposition); Jeffrey M. Jones, Same-Sex Marriage Support Solidifies Above 50% in 
U.S., GALLUP POLITICS (May 13, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162398/sex-marriage
-support-solidifies-above.aspx [hereinafter GALLUP POLL] (finding 53% support and 45% 
opposition). 
 3. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675. 
 4. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652. 
 5. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT 
(2004). 
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women and men may marry or have their out-of-state marriages recognized 
regardless of sexual orientation—and after Windsor, receive federal as well as state 
benefits associated with marriage.6 
The Court’s invalidation of DOMA, and the very fact that the outcome was 
widely anticipated, marked an extraordinary evolution in constitutional law, as 
interpreted by the Court and understood by the American people. Windsor’s 
discussion of the merits began by emphasizing the rapid and recent changes in how 
states and the public have approached the issue.7 When Congress enacted DOMA 
in 1996, every state limited marriage to a man and a woman and many Americans 
had not seriously contemplated that it could be otherwise. 
Justice Antonin Scalia alluded to that change, with the intent of discrediting its 
legitimate role in constitutional interpretation, during the March 2013 oral 
arguments when he pressed marriage-equality advocate Theodore Olson to answer 
the question: “When did it become unconstitutional to exclude homosexual couples 
from marriage?”8 This question foreshadowed the two principal grounds on which 
Windsor is constitutionally significant: first, for what it said about the substantive 
constitutional protections that apply to sexual orientation discrimination, and 
second, for the interpretive methodology the Court used to reach its conclusions. 
Windsor’s four opinions—one for the five-Justice majority and three for the four 
dissenting Justices—disagreed about precisely what the Court concluded, which 
may caution restraint in speculating about the case’s future import.9 This Essay 
hazards the prediction that 2013 will be regarded as a momentous year in the 
history of two distinct legal/political movements that first gained momentum in the 
1980s: most obviously, strengthening the movement to combat sexual orientation 
discrimination and repression; and, more generally and less noted, weakening the 
movement to promote “originalism” in constitutional interpretation and American 
politics. 
Paradoxically, in breaking new ground and interpreting the Fifth Amendment 
expansively to reflect the American people’s changed understandings, the Windsor 
Court adhered to a traditional interpretive approach and implicitly rejected efforts, 
begun in earnest during the Reagan Administration, to substitute a form of 
originalism that would yield radically different interpretations across a great range 
of issues. Behind Justice Scalia’s question at oral argument was a form of 
originalism, for which he has emerged as the best-known advocate, that seeks to 
interpret the Constitution with reference only to the text and the original meaning 
of the text at the time of the provision’s adoption, understood at a very specific 
level of meaning. In holding that DOMA violated “basic due process and equal 
protection principles,” the Court instead relied heavily upon “the community’s . . . 
evolving understanding of the meaning of equality.”10 Windsor thus reflects not 
only constitutional change in the direction of more expansive judicial protection of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 6. States, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/ (figure as of 
December 15, 2013, the date this Essay went to press). 
 7. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689. 
 8. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 12-144). 
 9. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682 (Kennedy, J.), 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), 
2697 (Scalia, J., dissenting), 2711 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 10. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. 
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equal protection and due process, but also fidelity to a mainstream approach to 
interpreting the Constitution that considers a range of sources and methods and 
allows for the consideration of evolving social norms and constitutional 
understandings. 
The exchange between Justice Scalia and Mr. Olson (who it is worth noting had 
served as a high-ranking official in the Reagan and George W. Bush 
administrations) conveys the essential difference in the competing approaches: 
 JUSTICE SCALIA: [W]hen did it become unconstitutional to exclude 
homosexual couples from marriage? 1791? 1868, when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was adopted? . . . 
 
 MR. OLSON: When—may I answer this in the form of a rhetorical 
question? When did it become unconstitutional to prohibit interracial 
marriages? When did it become unconstitutional to assign children to 
separate schools[?] 
 
 JUSTICE SCALIA: It's an easy question, I think, for that one. At—at 
the time that the Equal Protection Clause was adopted. . . . 
 
. . . 
 
 MR. OLSON: There’s no specific date in time. This is an evolutionary 
cycle.11 
The Court of course had not yet ruled on the constitutionality of state 
discrimination and as of the writing of this Essay, still has not. Indeed, it was so 
determined to avoid the issue in Perry that it may have reached the wrong 
conclusion on standing. In Windsor, the Court held DOMA unconstitutional on 
grounds tied to its particular facts: DOMA’s “purpose and effect to disparage and 
to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in 
personhood and dignity.”12 Justice Scalia’s Windsor dissent makes a strong case, 
however, that a holding that it is “unconstitutional to exclude homosexual couples 
from marriage” is just a matter of time, and perhaps not much time.13 
In this Essay, I accept Justice Scalia’s invitation to focus on dates and consider 
how his question might best be answered with reference to relevant dates in the 
United States’ constitutional history. This frame helps explain my expectation and 
my hope that the Court’s decisions of 2013 will prove vital for the future of not 
only the substantive constitutional protections against marriage discrimination but 
also how the Court and “We the People” interpret the Constitution across a range of 
issues—and that those decisions will hasten the end of a narrow form of 
originalism that would be devastating to both “the liberty of the individual” and 
“the demands of organized society.”14 Beyond Windsor, I would point to the 
Court’s decision issued a day earlier in Shelby County holding unconstitutional a 
core provision of the Federal Voting Rights Act. Justice Scalia joined a bare five-
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38–39, Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 12-144). 
 12. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696. 
 13. Id. at 2709–11 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 14. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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Justice majority opinion despite its plain inconsistency with his professed 
originalist approach—to the detriment of racial equality and democracy.15 
Countless articles and books, of course, have been written about each of the dates 
and issues I briefly address. My observations will by necessity be selective and will 
include a few of a personal nature, based on my legal work over the last quarter 
century as well as by virtue of simply having lived through a time of remarkable 
social and legal change.16 
An important initial note about terminology: a political and legal movement 
during the 1980s adopted the label “originalism” in opposition to what it 
characterized as “activist,” pro-rights, anti-federalism rulings of the Warren and the 
Burger Courts. How best to use the term today, however, is sharply and 
interestingly contested among those who endorse a more mainstream interpretive 
approach: some are content to cede the term while others seek to redefine it and 
talk in terms of “originalisms,” plural, including to emphasize that they too care 
about original meaning. For example, Professor Jack Balkin has called for “living 
originalism,”17 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has asserted, “I count myself as an 
originalist too,”18 and then-Supreme Court nominee Elena Kagan has declared, “we 
are all originalists.”19 Diversity exists, too, on the ideological right, seen, for 
example, in self-described originalist defenses of Brown v. Board of Education20 
and the Court’s extension of constitutional protections against sex discrimination.21 
Justice Scalia has described himself as a “faint-hearted originalist”22 and “an 
originalist and a textualist, not a nut,”23 and he in fact at times has acknowledged 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 16. Before joining the faculty at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law in 1998, I 
served as law clerk to Richard D. Cudahy on the U.S Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit (1986–87), staff counsel fellow at the ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project (1987–
88), legal director of NARAL Pro-Choice America (1988–93), and deputy assistant attorney 
general (1993–96) and acting assistant attorney general (1997–98) for the Office of Legal 
Counsel at the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 17. Compare JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011), with DAVID A. STRAUSS, 
THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010). 
 18. Ariane de Vogue, Justice Ginsburg Speaks About Gender Equality, ABCNEWS 
(Nov. 18, 2011, 1:15 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/11/justice-ginsburg
-speaks-about-gender-equality/. 
 19. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. 62 (2010) (statement of Elena Kagan). 
 20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 21. See e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 
VA. L. REV. 947 (1995); Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex 
Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
 22. “I hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist. I cannot 
imagine myself, any more than any other federal judge, upholding a statute that imposes the 
punishment of flogging.” Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 
849, 864 (1989). In a 2013 interview, Justice Scalia repudiated that statement. Jennifer 
Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 7, 2013, at 1, available at 
http://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/. 
 23. Nina Totenberg, Justice Scalia, the Great Dissenter, Opens Up, NPR (April 28, 
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the legitimacy of other interpretive sources such as precedent and the varying 
consequences of competing interpretations. Among the Justices, it is Justice 
Clarence Thomas who comes closest to principled adherence to a narrow form of 
originalism.24 
Although I appreciate the desire among moderates and progressives not to cede 
the term, as well as the diversity of originalisms on the right, I feel it equally vital to 
recognize that, to the extent we are all originalists, we also all are living 
constitutionalists.25 This Essay principally addresses the popularly recognized 1980s 
form of originalism represented most prominently among the Justices by Justice 
Scalia, in academia by Robert Bork, and in politics and government by President 
Reagan’s Attorney General Edwin Meese.26 That narrow and rigid originalism, which 
achieved its apex in 1986 with Bowers v. Hardwick’s upholding of a Georgia 
criminal ban on sodomy,27 is utterly irreconcilable with Windsor and Shelby County. 
Those June 2013 decisions, I believe, may signal originalism’s demise. 
1791 and 1868: Adoption of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
A constitutional provision’s meaning at the time of its adoption is a 
longstanding component of mainstream constitutional analysis. Justice Scalia’s 
exchange with Mr. Olson, however, insists upon the year of adoption as a complete 
response, and the only legitimate one to his question. Hence his suggestion of the 
years of adoption of the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments: 1791 and 1868. 
Seeking thus to limit constitutional meaning to text and specific meaning at the 
time of ratification is the hallmark of the modern originalism movement. 
For an originalist, analysis of the constitutionality of DOMA or any 
discriminatory federal law is complicated by the fact that the Fifth Amendment, the 
source of relevant constraints on Congress, does not include an Equal Protection 
Clause (unlike the state-constraining Fourteenth Amendment). Both contain Due 
Process clauses.28 Justice Scalia asked his question in Perry where the California 
law was at issue, so he appropriately referenced 1868 and “when the Equal 
Protection Clause was adopted” in response to Mr. Olson’s rhetorical questions 
                                                                                                                 
2008, 7:32 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89986017. 
 24. See, e.g., McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (Justice Scalia 
“acquiesced” in “substantive due process” doctrine to invalidate state gun control measures). 
Many have noted the differences between Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas. See, e.g., 
Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 7, 7 (2006) (“This leaves Justice Thomas as the only justice who seems at all bound 
by originalist conclusions with which he may disagree.”). 
 25. See Dawn Johnsen, Justice Brennan: Legacy of a Champion, 111 MICH. L. REV. 
1151, 1178–81 (2013) (reviewing SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMEIL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: 
LIBERAL CHAMPION (2010)). 
 26. See infra text accompanying notes 69–85 (1986–87: Bowers and Bork). To 
underscore the complexity of using the term, even Antonin Scalia, Robert Bork, and Edwin 
Meese differed somewhat in their approaches to originalism. 
 27. See 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 28. “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V; “No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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about racial segregation and bans on interracial marriage. For DOMA, however, the 
directly relevant text is the 1791 Due Process Clause. 
It does not take a constitutional historian to appreciate that the specific original 
meanings of due process/liberty and equal protection in both 1791 and 1868 do not 
support constitutional protection against sexual orientation discrimination in 
marriage laws, state or federal. In Windsor, the Court flatly rejected Justice Scalia’s 
originalism and went decidedly with Mr. Olson’s “evolutionary” approach. 
Whether characterized as “living constitutionalism,”29 “living originalism,”30 or 
simply constitutional interpretation, the roots of Windsor in this respect can be 
traced to another early year, 1819, when the Court issued a decision widely viewed 
as foundational, McCulloch v. Maryland.31 Chief Justice John Marshall there 
described the Constitution as “intended to endure for ages to come, and, 
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”32 The Court in 
McCulloch was interpreting the scope of congressional powers, but its reasoning 
for a flexible, evolving approach properly informs constitutional interpretation 
more generally: 
To have prescribed the means by which government should, in all 
future time, execute its powers, would have been to change, entirely, 
the character of the instrument, and give it the properties of a legal 
code. It would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable 
rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen 
dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur.33 
In another often-quoted passage, the Court further admonished, “[W]e must never 
forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.”34 McCulloch remains a 
canonical decision, the foundation of the Court’s interpretive approach, which 
Justice Breyer has characterized as including “traditional legal tools, such as text, 
history, tradition, precedent, and purposes and related consequences.”35 
1954: Brown 
The central role Justice Anthony Kennedy would play on matters of sexual 
orientation discrimination became apparent at least a decade before Windsor when 
                                                                                                                 
 
 29. See STRAUSS, supra note 17. 
 30. See BALKIN, supra note 17. 
 31. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).  
 32. Id. at 415 (emphasis omitted). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 407 (emphasis in original). 
 35. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 74 (2010); see 
also H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY 
AND POLITICS 205, 208 (2002) (Our nation’s “shared constitutional first principles” include: 
“In constitutional argument it is legitimate to invoke text, constitutional structure, original 
meaning, original intent, judicial precedent and doctrine, political-branch practice and 
doctrine, settled expectations, the ethos of American constitutionalism, the traditions of our 
law and our people, and the consequences of differing interpretations of the Constitution.”) 
(emphasis omitted). 
2014] THE DEMISE OF ORIGINALISM 9 
 
his 2003 opinion for the Court in Lawrence v. Texas directed attention to the year 
1954, and the Court’s unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of Education,36 as a 
critical point in evolving constitutional understandings.37 One of originalism’s 
greatest challenges has been the difficulty in squaring a court-ordered end to racial 
segregation of public schools with the specific meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment at its 1868 adoption, when Northern as well as Southern states 
maintained racially segregated schools and Congress itself segregated the schools 
in the District of Columbia.38 Mr. Olson’s rhetorical question—“When did it 
become unconstitutional to assign children to separate schools?”—evokes the fact 
that the Framers clearly did not intend that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause would prohibit racial segregation. That understanding came in 
1954 with Brown’s rejection of a narrow, rigid originalism: “[W]e cannot turn the 
clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when 
[Plessy] was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full 
development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.”39 
Arguably even more difficult on originalist grounds was Brown’s companion 
case Bolling v. Sharpe,40 which held that the segregation of the District of 
Columbia schools was inconsistent with the “liberty” protected under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment—adopted in 1791, a time when enslaving 
persons of African American descent was widely regarded as consistent with this 
guarantee of “liberty.” The Court acknowledged that the absence of an Equal 
Protection Clause made the issue “somewhat different,” but disposed of the case in 
six short paragraphs.41 The Bolling Court found that “the concepts of equal 
protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are 
not mutually exclusive.”42 The Court merged consideration of the two concepts as 
well as the standards of review that are familiar today, to the end that due process 
protects against at least some forms of discrimination that, when committed by 
states, are approached as a matter of equal protection. The Court cited what we 
today call strict scrutiny reserved for suspect classifications and fundamental 
liberties but then found that segregation was “not reasonably related to any proper 
governmental objective,”43 the familiar standard of rational basis review. The Court 
offered little else on the precise effect the Fourteenth Amendment has on 
interpreting its predecessor amendment, except to note: “In view of our decision 
that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated 
                                                                                                                 
 
 36. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 37. 539 U.S. 558, 571–72 (2003) (“[W]e think that our laws and traditions in the past 
half century are of most relevance . . . .”). 
 38. See 2 RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 801–04 (1st ed. 1975). 
 39. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492–93; see also id. at 489 (finding the evidence of intent 
“inconclusive”). 
 40. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 499. 
 43. Id. at 499–500 (“Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which the 
individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental 
objective.”). 
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public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a 
lesser duty on the Federal Government.”44 Bolling would become a key precedent 
for Windsor’s treatment of the discrimination claim brought under the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.45 
1965/1967: Griswold and Loving 
When Mr. Olson raised the closest precedent for marriage equality for gays and 
lesbians with his rhetorical response to Justice Scalia—“When did it become 
unconstitutional to prohibit interracial marriages?”—he knew well that the Court 
did not end state criminalization of interracial marriage until the startlingly late date 
of 1967, in Loving v. Virginia.46 Even in the 1960s, the issue was a live one: 
counsel for Mildred and Richard Loving explained at oral argument that sixteen 
states banned interracial marriage, recently down from seventeen following 
Maryland’s repeal and failed repeal efforts in Oklahoma and Missouri.47 Of interest 
with regard to the issue of the timing of the Court’s resolution of controversial 
constitutional questions, the Loving Court stressed it had never before addressed 
the issue,48 even though it had dodged a challenge to that very Virginia statute a 
decade earlier when the Virginia Supreme Court upheld it.49 Moreover, as the 
Loving Court noted, in 1883 it had faced a closely related question and upheld 
Alabama’s conviction and two-year sentence of an interracial couple for living 
together while unmarried.50 
The State of Virginia’s defense centered on arguing that the statute punished 
whites and African Americans equally and thus did not discriminate on the basis of 
race, and, relatedly, that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend 
to prohibit such a use of race.51 Mildred and Richard Loving both had been 
sentenced to a year in prison for marrying a person of a different race. The Court 
unanimously held that the ban plainly used race for the purpose of promoting 
“White Supremacy” in violation of equal protection of the laws.52 The Court held 
                                                                                                                 
 
 44. Id. at 500. 
 45. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (“[DOMA] violates 
basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government. See 
U.S. CONST., Amdt. 5; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 . . . (1954).”). 
 46. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 47. Transcript of Oral Argument, Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (No. 12-144), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1966/1966_395. 
 48. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 2 (“This case presents a constitutional question never 
addressed by this Court: whether a statutory scheme adopted by the State of Virginia to 
prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications violates the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 49. See Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80 (1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), remanded to, 
197 Va. 734 (1956), motion to recall denied, 350 U.S. 985 (1956). 
 50. Loving, 388 U.S. at 10 (citing Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883)). Alabama was 
the last state in the nation to have on its books a criminal ban on interracial marriage. 
Alabama Considers Lifting Interracial Marriage Ban, CNN.COM (Mar. 12, 1999, 1:32 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/US/9903/12/interracial.marriage/. 
 51. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 7–8. 
 52. Id. 
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further that the law deprived the Lovings of liberty in violation of due process by 
denying them “the freedom to marry,” and cited for support Skinner v. Oklahoma, a 
1942 case recognizing constitutional protection against forcible sterilization.53 
Government prohibitions on same-sex marriage and sexual intimacy similarly 
are challenged today on both equal protection and liberty/due process grounds. But 
given the pervasive past discrimination against homosexuality and the unsettled 
status of even interracial marriage in the mid-1960s, there was no chance the Court 
would have recognized those parallels at that time and protected “the freedom to 
marry” someone of the same sex. Among the overwhelming historical evidence are 
statements to the effect that homosexuality is not constitutionally protected in 
various opinions in the 1965 case Griswold v. Connecticut, which upheld the 
constitutional right of married couples to use contraception, and a 1961 dissent in 
Poe v. Ullman in which Justice Harlan dissented from the Court’s dismissal of a 
challenge to the same Connecticut ban on contraception.54 In all, five of the seven 
Justices in the Griswold majority joined opinions that distinguished the state’s 
authority to ban homosexuality or illicit relationships. 
Justice Harlan’s Griswold concurrence has withstood the test of time and, 
together with his Poe dissent (which he incorporated by reference), describes still-
followed standards for interpreting the “liberty” protected substantively by the 
guarantee of due process.55 Although Justice Harlan distinguished rights associated 
with homosexuality, his interpretive approach plainly left open the possibility that a 
future Court could reach a different conclusion. Citing McCulloch, he wrote of the 
importance of “approaching the text . . . not in a literalistic way, as if we had a tax 
statute before us, but as the basic charter of our society, setting out in spare but 
                                                                                                                 
 
 53. Id. at 12 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 
(1942)) (“Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very 
existence and survival.”). The Court also wrote of the two protections together. Compare 
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (“[D]iscrimination may be so unjustifiable as to 
be violative of due process.”), with Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (“To deny this fundamental 
freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, 
classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without due 
process of law.”). 
 54. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) 
(specifically referencing homosexuality, Justice Goldberg quoted Justice Harlan’s Poe 
dissent, stating: “It is one thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid extra-marital 
sexuality . . . or to say who may marry, but it is quite another when, having acknowledged a 
marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal 
law the details of that intimacy.”); id. at 505 (White, J., concurring) (stating that state 
policies against “promiscuous or illicit sexual relationships” are a “legitimate legislative 
goal”); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 552 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The right of 
privacy most manifestly is not an absolute. Thus, I would not suggest that adultery, 
homosexuality, fornication and incest are immune from criminal enquiry, however privately 
practiced.”). 
 55.  See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining his reasoning by 
reference to the “reasons stated at length in my dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman”); see 
also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848–49 (1992) (citing Justice 
Harlan’s dissent in Poe and subsequent concurrence in Griswold). 
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meaningful terms the principles of government.”56 Constitutional interpretation 
must strike a balance between “the liberty of the individual” and “the demands of 
organized society” and have “regard to what history teaches are the traditions from 
which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a 
living thing.”57 Loving and Griswold thus are central to understanding the process 
by which discrimination against same-sex marriage has come to be understood as 
unconstitutional, in terms of the substantive protections of equal protection and 
liberty and the connections between the two, the appropriate interpretive 
methodology and role of original meaning, and the Court’s practice of delaying 
resolution of controversial issues until it decides the time is right. 
1973: Roe and Frontiero 
Justice Scalia is correct that the original meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, construed narrowly consistent with his approach to originalism, did 
not encompass protection against sex discrimination or governmental control of 
personal decisions about sexuality and childbearing.58 In 1873, the pervasive 
unequal treatment of women included a Court decision upholding an Illinois law 
that excluded women from the practice of law, with Justice Bradley now 
infamously concurring to declare that “[t]he paramount destiny and mission of 
woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.”59 As 
recently as 1961, the Court cited women’s special role as mothers to uphold a state 
exclusion of women from mandatory jury service.60 
In the early 1970s the Court began to protect women from laws that limited their 
opportunities to what in 1868 commonly was viewed as women’s “natural” role. In 
1973 Justice William Brennan’s landmark plurality for four Justices in Frontiero v. 
Richardson made the case that sex discrimination should trigger heightened judicial 
scrutiny. Four additional Justices found that the federal law, which gave men 
higher presumed benefits on the assumption they typically are heads of households, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 56. Poe, 367 U.S. at 540 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 
(4 Wheat) 316 (1819)). 
 57. Id. at 542. 
 58. See Nina Totenberg, Interviewing Scalia: Verbal Wrestling Match with a Master, 
NPR (July 25, 2012, 6:23 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/07/25
/157384080/interviewing-scalia-verbal-wrestling-match-with-a-master; see also Jack M. 
Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007). 
 59. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873). This is a useful point to 
remind of the diversities of originalism. It was in response to a law professor’s originalist 
argument that women were not protected under the Equal Protection Clause that Justice 
Ginsburg, a chief advocate in the 1970s for constitutional protection against sex 
discrimination, declared: “I have a different originalist view. I count myself as an originalist 
too, but in a quite different way from the professor.” de Vogue, supra note 18. 
 60. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961) (“[A] woman is still regarded as the center 
of home and family life. We cannot say that it is constitutionally impermissible for a 
State . . . to conclude that a woman should be relieved from the civic duty of jury service 
unless she herself determines that such service is consistent with her own special 
responsibilities.”). 
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did not survive even mere rational basis review.61 That same year, a seven-Justice 
majority held that the right to liberty substantively protected the right of women to 
be free from governmental interference with the decision whether to terminate a 
pregnancy, such that abortion restrictions would trigger strict judicial scrutiny.62 
These protections for women would prove significant for the equality and liberty 
of gays and lesbians, but the Court and the country certainly were not ready to 
make those connections at the time. In 1972 the Court dismissed, on what was 
supposed to be a mandatory appeal, a constitutional challenge to a Minnesota 
statute that limited marriage to heterosexual couples; Justice Scalia referenced the 
case in his rhetorical questioning of Mr. Olson, suggesting as a possible date, 
“some time after Baker, where we said it didn’t even raise a substantial Federal 
question?”63 Nor was the Court ready to recognize restrictions on women’s 
reproductive liberty as a form of sex discrimination.64 Later criticism of the Roe 
Court for being inadequately sensitive to that connection tends to lack adequate 
grounding in historical reality, just as does criticism that Roe actually set back 
reproductive rights by getting too far ahead of public opinion.65 Indeed, throughout 
the 1970s, many equality advocates argued against the possible connections 
between discrimination on the basis of sex, on the one hand, and restrictions on 
abortion or homosexuality, on the other, due to fear of harming efforts to ratify the 
Equal Rights Amendment, which opponents argued would legalize homosexuality 
and protect access to abortion.66 
Even forty years later, sex discrimination challenges to abortion or sexual 
orientation restrictions, although to my mind theoretically strong, generally have not 
prevailed. In my experience working in reproductive rights advocacy, the terms of 
political and legal advocacy are greatly affected by public opinion, even as advocates 
struggle to undo popular prejudices. In 1973 (and even today), “women’s rights” and 
“women’s liberty” were far less popular concepts than the “right to privacy” or 
leaving the abortion decision to women in consultation with their physicians, 
husbands, and clergy—as opposed to giving that private decision to politicians. 
Justices increasingly have noted the equality implications of abortion restrictions, but 
the Court still has not directly made the doctrinal connection to equal protection.67 
                                                                                                                 
 
 61. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691–92 (1973); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190, 197–98 (1976) (adopting intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny as the 
form of heightened scrutiny appropriate for sex discrimination). 
 62. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 63. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 12-
144) (discussing Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)). 
 64. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (describing discrimination on the basis 
of pregnancy as not sex discrimination, but discrimination between pregnant and non-
pregnant persons). 
 65. Roe’s companion case, Doe v. Bolton, involved restrictions short of criminal bans 
and thus makes this even less plausible. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). See Linda Greenhouse & Reva 
B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 
2028 (2011). 
 66. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and 
Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006). 
 67. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Thornburgh v. 
Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
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Most recently, in 2007, Justice Ginsburg’s four-Justice dissent in Gonzales v. Carhart 
chastised the five-Justice majority for using reasoning in upholding abortion 
restrictions that “reflects ancient notions about women’s place in the family and 
under the Constitution—ideas that have long since been discredited.”68 
1986–87: Bowers and Bork 
Many readers may have personal markers from which to consider Justice 
Scalia’s intriguing question and the social and constitutional change of the last 
quarter century. I graduated from law school in 1986, the year the Court held by a 
five-to-four vote in Bowers v. Hardwick that the Constitution did not protect 
against laws that made it a crime for consenting adults of the same sex to be 
physically intimate in the privacy of their own homes.69 A few months later, Justice 
Scalia joined the Court (with a confirmation vote of ninety-eight to zero) to succeed 
William Rehnquist, who was appointed Chief Justice. The next year brought the 
retirement of Justice Lewis Powell, a necessary fifth vote in Bowers as well as in 
cases affirming Roe v. Wade and protecting against sex discrimination.70 President 
Reagan nominated Robert Bork of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. 
These events will be familiar to many. My attention was particularly keen because 
I was completing a one-year fellowship at the American Civil Liberties Union and 
most seriously considering two jobs: legal director of a reproductive rights 
organization at a time Roe seemed in jeopardy, and staff attorney at the ACLU’s 
then-fledgling LGBT project when combatting criminal sodomy laws and 
employment and AIDS-related discrimination topped the agenda (and certainly not 
marriage equality). I vividly recall that, of the two, LGBT issues seemed far more 
controversial and difficult to foresee success. Roe, although in immediate jeopardy in 
the Court, enjoyed strong and consistent support among the American public. In the 
years since, the legal and political standing of the two sets of issues, which are closely 
aligned in many doctrinal and theoretical respects, have dramatically flipped in ways 
very few would have predicted.71 My personal response to “when did it become 
unconstitutional to exclude homosexual couples from marriage” is that the evolution 
has been astounding since I was admitted to the bar, twenty-six years ago, and events 
around the time of my bar admission were central to that progress. 
The Bowers Court upheld the application to “consensual homosexual sodomy” 
(declining to address heterosexual sodomy) of a Georgia law that imposed criminal 
penalties of one to twenty years of imprisonment for engaging in oral or anal sex.72 
Michael Hardwick was arrested for having consensual oral sex in his own bedroom 
with a man. In a remarkably short opinion that relied heavily on specific original 
meaning, the Court cited all of the sodomy bans on the books of all thirteen states 
                                                                                                                 
 
 68. 550 U.S. 124, 185 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 69. See 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 70. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Thornburgh, 476 
U.S. 747. 
 71. My decision was made easy when Nan Hunter, then-director of the ACLU LGBT 
project, offered the excellent advice that I should take the legal director position—and did 
not offer me the other. 
 72. Bowers, 478 U.S. 186. 
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when they ratified the Bill of Rights and the bans in place in all but five of the then-
thirty-seven states at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification.73 The 
Court went beyond narrow originalism concerns and also noted that twenty-four 
states continued to ban private consensual sodomy in 1986.74 Beyond that, the 
Court said little and was remarkably dismissive of what it called a “facetious” 
claim.75 It declared that none of the liberties it previously had found within the 
fundamental right to privacy “bears any resemblance” to Hardwick’s claim and that 
“[i]t is obvious to us” that a fundamental right of homosexuals to engage in 
consensual sodomy is neither “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” 
nor “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”76 Justice Powell, who later 
expressed regret for casting a decisive fifth vote, authored a concurrence that 
signaled ambivalence by suggesting that the law might violate the Eighth 
Amendment, an argument not presented to the Court.77 
When in 1987 President Reagan nominated Judge Bork to succeed Justice 
Powell, Bork was originalism’s intellectual leader. He also had authored an 
influential opinion, which Bowers cited, that held against a claim of sexual 
orientation discrimination.78 Attorney General Edwin Meese, appointed in 1985, 
became originalism’s chief public advocate, leading the Reagan administration’s 
pursuit of extensive constitutional change: in favor of an approach to federalism 
that would enhance state sovereignty and diminish congressional power and in 
opposition to the pro-rights “activism” of the Warren Court and continued under 
Justice William Brennan’s leadership. Chief Justice Rehnquist was the Court’s 
leader in this regard. Meese’s principal contribution was to make Judge Bork’s 
form of originalism the centerpiece of that agenda, even where it actually did not fit 
(as in affirmative action and congressional authority), through public advocacy, 
lengthy Department of Justice reports, government litigation, and judicial 
appointments.79 To give just one example, a Department of Justice report directing 
government litigators to feature originalism selected Bowers as a model of 
originalism and listed as “inconsistent” with originalism and thus illegitimate 
(among many others): Skinner v. Oklahoma’s protection against forced 
sterilization, Griswold v. Connecticut’s protection of the right of a married couple 
to use contraception, Loving v. Virginia’s recognition of a right to marry, and Roe 
v. Wade’s protection of the right to decide whether to have an abortion.80 The report 
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. Id. at 192–93 & nn.5–7. 
 74. Id. at 193–94. 
 75. Id. at 194. 
 76. Id. at 190, 192, 194. 
 77. See id. at 197 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Joan Biskupic & Fred Barbash, 
Retired Justice Lewis Powell Dies at 90, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1998, at A1 (quoting Justice 
Powell as saying that he “probably made a mistake in [Bowers]”). 
 78. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 79. For extensive discussion (with citations) of the leadership provided to the 1980s 
originalism movement by Judge Bork, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Attorney General 
Meese, see Johnsen, supra note 25, at 1167–81; Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the 
Rehnquist Court on Congressional Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional 
Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363, 385–406 (2003). 
 80. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES ON 
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described the protection of women from discrimination under heightened judicial 
scrutiny as “tenuous at best” and the recognition of any additional classes protected 
under equal protection analysis as illegitimate.81 
The Reagan Administration relied heavily upon Judge Bork’s writings.82 The 
Senate refused to confirm Judge Bork, on a vote of fifty-eight to forty-two, largely 
for the views expressed in those same writings, prominent among them a 1971 
article in the Indiana Law Journal.83 All of the issues discussed to this point in this 
chronology were the subject of the Senate’s intense questioning of Judge Bork in 
confirmation hearings that gripped the nation, particularly his views against 
Griswold and constitutional protection for a right of privacy.84 President Reagan 
ultimately nominated, and the Senate confirmed, Anthony Kennedy to Justice 
Powell’s seat, an event that would prove of great consequence for the direction of 
the Court. In 2008, long-time New York Times Supreme Court reporter Linda 
Greenhouse, reflecting on a thirty-year illustrious career covering the Court, 
astutely captured the core difference between Robert Bork and Anthony Kennedy: 
“Judge Bork’s constitutional vision, anchored in the past, was tested and found 
wanting, in contrast to the later declaration by Judge Anthony M. Kennedy, the 
successful nominee, that the Constitution’s framers had ‘made a covenant with the 
future.’”85 
1992: Casey 
Noteworthy among the many consequential cases in which Robert Bork likely 
would have voted differently than Justice Kennedy is the 1992 decision Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.86 The events of this period 
remain vivid to me: at the time I served as the legal director of a reproductive rights 
organization that had just helped lead opposition to the nomination of Clarence 
Thomas to replace retiring Justice Thurgood Marshall, in part because it seemed 
virtually certain he would provide the fifth vote to overrule Roe.87 In Casey, Justice 
Thomas voted as expected and joined Justice Scalia and Roe’s two original 
dissenters, William Rehnquist and Byron White.88 But Justice Kennedy’s vote 
                                                                                                                 
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 78–83 (1988) [hereinafter GUIDELINES] (listing by issue 
examples of Supreme Court opinions the Reagan Administration believed were “consistent” 
with originalism and those that were wrongly decided). 
 81. Id. at 78. 
 82. See, e.g., id. at 3. 
 83. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. 1 (1971). 
 84. See generally MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: AN INSIDER’S 
ACCOUNT OF AMERICA’S REJECTION OF ROBERT BORK’S NOMINATION TO THE SUPREME 
COURT (1992). 
 85. Linda Greenhouse, 2,691 Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2008, at WK1. 
 86. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 87. Cf. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (Justice Kennedy joined 
a four-Justice plurality that applied only rational basis review to uphold abortion 
restrictions). The nomination ended in Thomas’s confirmation by a vote of fifty-two to forty-
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(Senate confirmation of Justice Thomas). 
 88. Casey, 505 U.S. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
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surprised all sides: he coauthored an extraordinary “joint” opinion with Justices 
Sandra Day O’Connor and David Souter that was joined by a total of five Justices 
in parts that reaffirmed “Roe’s essential holding.”89 
The five Justices in the Casey majority parted ways on some particulars vital to 
women’s reproductive liberty,90 but they found remarkable agreement on the issues 
most directly relevant to Justice Scalia’s question about the timing of protections 
related to sexual orientation. The Casey joint opinion relied heavily on Justice 
Harlan’s Poe/Griswold approach to fundamental rights—which the Court in 
Bowers had ignored entirely.91 It reaffirmed application of that approach to the 
right to use contraception not only for married couples, but also, as the Court had 
subsequently held, for unmarried individuals and minors, stating “[w]e have no 
doubt as to the correctness of those decisions.”92 The Court also forcefully rejected 
Justice Scalia’s narrow originalist approach as “inconsistent with our law.”93 
The Casey Court further emphasized the importance of constitutional change in 
its extended discussion of stare decisis. In discussing Brown’s overruling of Plessy, 
the Court emphasized the constitutional relevance of society’s evolving 
understanding of facts: “Society’s understanding of the facts upon which a 
constitutional ruling was sought in 1954 was thus fundamentally different from the 
basis claimed for the decision in 1896.”94 The Court declared that “Plessy was 
wrong the day it was decided” but explained, in language Windsor would echo, 
why the Court could not appreciate that at the time: “[Brown is] comprehensible as 
the Court’s response to facts that the country could understand, or had come to 
understand already, but which the Court of an earlier day, as its own declarations 
disclosed, had not been able to perceive.”95 
1996: DOMA and Romer 
When Congress passed DOMA in 1996 by overwhelming margins and President 
Bill Clinton signed it into law, I was a deputy assistant attorney general in the U.S. 
Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), which advises the 
President on constitutional and other legal (as opposed to policy) questions. I recall 
significant time spent during my five years at OLC on several legal issues related to 
sexual orientation, in part driven by President Clinton’s strong opposition to sexual 
orientation discrimination, including the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, the 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act, legislation to protect against hate crimes 
committed because of the victim’s sexual orientation, legislation that required the 
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 89. Id. at 843, 846. 
 90. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in fact charged that the joint opinion “retains the 
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 94. Id. at 863. 
 95. Id. 
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military to discharge HIV-positive individuals, and the provision of the Colorado 
Constitution at issue in Romer v. Evans.96 These issues raised complex legal 
questions, but DOMA did not. 
Then-head of OLC (and my direct boss) Walter Dellinger recently noted that the 
Department of Justice’s statement at the time was “carefully worded to avoid 
opining that the Justice Department itself believed DOMA was constitutional”97 
and instead stated: “The Department of Justice believes that the Defense of 
Marriage Act would be sustained as constitutional if challenged in court . . . .”98 
This statement clearly was an accurate assessment at the time. The Court would not 
overrule Bowers v. Hardwick for another six years, and if a state could send a gay 
couple to prison for up to twenty years for their relationship, the federal 
government certainly did not have to afford the benefits associated with marriage to 
the couple—particularly at a time no state allowed same-sex couples to marry. 
Even among those who thought DOMA terrible policy and Bowers wrongly 
decided, few could have imagined that in seventeen years the Court would strike it 
down or that most Americans would oppose it.99  
In 1996 Gallup for the first time polled the American public on the question of 
same-sex marriage: 27% favored legal recognition of same-sex marriages and 68% 
stated opposition.100 That same year, the Court decided Romer v. Evans on 
relatively narrow equal protection grounds that would prove important precedent 
for Windsor. The Court held that a Colorado constitutional provision that 
prohibited local governments from enacting measures to protect against sexual 
orientation discrimination failed even rational basis review.101 
2003: Lawrence 
By 2003 public opinion had begun to change, with 32% supportive of 
recognition of same-sex marriage and 59% opposed,102 and that year the LGBT 
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movement achieved a tremendous victory with the Court’s overruling of Bowers. 
Professor Jack Balkin posted the following hypothetical response to Justice Scalia’s 
question, under the title “Supreme Court Arguments We’d Like to See”: 
 JUSTICE SCALIA: You—you've led me right into a question I was 
going to ask. . . . I'm curious, when -when did—when did it become 
unconstitutional to exclude homosexual couples from marriage? 1791? 
1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted? . . . 
 
MR. OLSON: Well, according to your dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, 
the Court decided that issue in 2003.103 
Lawrence’s five-to-four overruling of Bowers and invalidation of consensual 
sodomy prohibitions—with an additional vote from Justice O’Connor for the 
outcome, on more limited grounds—dramatically changed DOMA’s prospects.104 
In striking down criminal prohibitions on consensual sodomy under a due 
process analysis, Justice Kennedy wrote eloquently about the harms such laws 
inflict on dignity, liberty, and equality. More generally, and of enormous 
consequence for marriage equality, the Court strongly rejected Justice Scalia’s 
originalism as an appropriate methodology and relied instead on the approach of 
the Casey joint opinion: 
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of 
liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. 
They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind 
us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought 
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution 
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their 
own search for greater freedom.105 
The Court, however, expressly reserved the issue of marriage, writing that the 
case “does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to 
any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”106 Justice Scalia 
responded: “Do not believe it.”107 Accusing the Court of deception, he wrote, “[t]he 
Court today pretends . . . that we need not fear judicial imposition of homosexual 
marriage . . . .”108 Justice Scalia interpreted the Court’s opinion as definitely (and 
wrongly) deciding the issue: “This case ‘does not involve’ the issue of homosexual 
marriage only if one entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do 
with the decisions of this Court.”109 
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2013: Windsor and Shelby County 
As of the writing of this Essay in 2013, the Court still has not held that it is 
“unconstitutional to exclude homosexual couples from marriage.” Windsor reached 
only the federal government’s discrimination against marriages that states have 
chosen to recognize. The federal government’s deviation from its traditional 
recognition of state marriages raised suspicions, confirmed by the Court, of a lack 
of legitimate purpose. In a dissent that strongly echoed his Lawrence dissent, 
Justice Scalia accused the Court of intentionally “fooling . . . readers” about the 
import of its decision.110 He ridiculed the Court for “jaw-dropping” and “rootless 
and shifting”111 reasoning, and “legalistic argle-bargle”112 that he speculated the 
Court had designed “to support its pretense” that it left “the second, state-law shoe 
to be dropped later,”113 which he predicted “will of a certitude”114 happen. An 
imagined response along Professor Balkin’s lines thus now might add: “And, 
Justice Scalia, according to your Windsor dissent, the Court eliminated any 
remaining doubt in 2013.” 
To conclude this chronology, I consider 2013’s significance both in 
strengthening the marriage equality movement (along the lines Justice Scalia 
predicts but deplores) and in diminishing the 1980s originalism movement (perhaps 
something Justice Scalia fears, which may help explain the bitter tone of his 
Lawrence and Windsor dissents). Regarding future marriage equality claims, the 
four dissenters were not all with Justice Scalia: all expressed strong views that 
DOMA is constitutional, but contrary to Justice Scalia (joined only by Justice 
Thomas in the merits discussion), Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito 
emphasized the limited nature of the Court’s holding and the influence of 
federalism concerns that would not be present in a state law challenge.115 Their 
analysis seems designed to encourage litigants and lower courts (and perhaps a 
future changed Court) to distinguish Windsor, while Justice Scalia’s dissent surely 
will be cited in support of challenges to state discrimination.116 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito are technically correct about the limited 
and restrained nature of Windsor’s holding, but Justice Scalia seems accurate in 
forecasting how the current Court would vote. A portion of his dissent cleverly 
quoted the Court’s opinion at length, omitting words that limited the reasoning to 
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the federal context.117 He opined that the ease with which the passages are 
transposable is deliberate, intended to facilitate that last step toward full marriage 
equality.118 Justice Scalia further charged the Court with, in effect, calling DOMA’s 
supporters “monsters,” “enemies of the human race,” “enem[ies] of human 
decency,” and people with “hateful hearts.”119 
The Court does not come close to meriting such charges, nor is anything 
underhanded about ruling modestly about only the federal law at issue. A broader 
ruling that reached the appropriate standard of review for sexual orientation 
discrimination would have provided clearer direction, but the Court instead 
unsurprisingly applied the enhanced form of rational basis review from Moreno, 
Cleburne, and Romer, as well as the early sex discrimination cases, where the 
Court saw reason for suspicion and “careful consideration” including of the actual 
purpose behind the discrimination.120 The Windsor majority took great care to 
explain the process of evolution in Americans’ views on marriage, for example, 
describing “the beginnings of a new perspective, a new insight.”121 The point is not 
that DOMA’s purpose reveals bad people who are enemies of human decency, but 
that people of good will and thoughtful consideration can evolve in their 
understandings of human dignity and equality—as we as a nation have in our 
understanding of why Plessy was wrong and why it was illegitimate (though 
understandable) for the government to privilege men based on a presumption they 
are the family breadwinners. Someone who once failed to recognize women’s 
“pedestal” as a cage is no “monster” with a “hateful heart”—but today we do 
recognize the cage.122 
Barring a change in the composition of the Court by the replacement of one of 
the five in the Windsor majority—and I would predict even then—the Court almost 
certainly will hold it “unconstitutional to exclude homosexual couples from 
marriage” and likely soon. Closely related, I predict that 2013 will accelerate the 
demise of the 1980s school of originalism. The Windsor majority adheres to and 
strengthens traditional interpretive methods that allow doctrinal evolution in 
response to social changes, as revealed in Lawrence, Casey, Griswold, Loving, and 
Brown. Indeed, those earlier cases may suggest that Scalia/Bork/Meese originalism 
was all but dead even before Windsor; the now-discredited 1986 Bowers opinion 
stands as its modern high-water mark. 
Focusing on the decline of 1980s originalism as a legal doctrine, however, 
would miss its significance as a political movement and organizing device that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 117. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2709–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 118. Id. at 2710. 
 119. Id. at 2707–11. 
 120. The Court twice quoted Romer’s call for “careful consideration” of “discriminations 
of an unusual character.” Id. at 2692–93 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 
(1996)); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
 121. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689. 
 122. For example, even as Justice Brennan wrote his landmark Frontiero plurality 
opinion, he initially refused to hire female law clerks and expressed the view he would not 
be able to serve on the Court if a woman ever were appointed. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 
U.S. 677, 684 (1973); STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 25, at 386–77. 
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continues today, especially within the Republican Party, as evidenced in judicial 
confirmation hearings and the Tea Party movement.123 It is in combatting 1980s 
originalism as an organizing and rhetorical device used to delegitimize progressive 
constitutionalism that 2013 may prove particularly consequential. The ultimate 
achievement of marriage equality throughout the nation now appears a matter of 
time, in large part because younger Americans are by far the most supportive. 
Indeed, 72% of Americans, and 59% of even those opposed to allowing same-sex 
marriage, describe an end to marriage discrimination as “inevitable.”124 And 
marriage equality as a constitutional matter is simply irreconcilable with any rigidly 
narrow form of originalism, perhaps even more inescapably than was the case with 
Brown, Loving, Frontiero, Griswold, and Roe, both as a methodological matter and, 
as important, in ways apparent to an American public that has lived through and 
increasingly embraces constitutional change at dramatic odds with the Framers’ 
original expectations and narrow original meanings.125 As more and more 
Americans see the same-sex marriages of their family, friends, and neighbors 
treated under the law with equal dignity, as Walter Dellinger has observed, “at 
work” will be “the enormous effect” of what Professor Charles Black, writing of 
race, described as the “normative power of the actual.”126 
The year 2013 may also prove significant in the demise of 1980s originalism 
because of a decision the Court issued the day before Windsor and Perry. At the 
same time Justice Kennedy led the Court to advance equality for gays and lesbians, 
he joined the dissenting Justices in Windsor to form a majority to invalidate a core 
provision of the federal Voting Rights Act, to the detriment of racial equality in 
political participation.127 A thorough discussion of Shelby County is beyond the 
scope of this Essay, but worthy of note, in addition to the strikingly different 
outcomes for race and sexual orientation, is the fact Justices Scalia and Thomas 
abandoned originalism and joined an opinion that focused instead on the changed 
conditions for racial minorities in the years since Congress first passed the Act.128 
The Court concluded that the improved political standing of racial minorities meant 
that Congress’s intrusions on state sovereignty no longer were justified—
notwithstanding that the section of the Fifteenth Amendment at issue by its plain 
and original meaning conferred on Congress the authority both to intrude upon 
state sovereignty to protect equality in voting and, equally fundamental, to make 
any necessary judgments about what current conditions require. Justice Ginsburg’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 123. From the outset and increasingly over time, originalism has proven far more 
powerful as political matter. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political 
Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 546, 554 (2006) 
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 124. PEW POLL, supra note 2. 
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 126. Dellinger, supra note 97. 
 127. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 128. See id. 
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dissent detailed the arguments from the constitutional text and original meaning, as 
well as other considerations that dictated judicial deference to Congress.129 The 
majority did not directly dispute that rational basis review was the appropriate 
standard, but it in fact applied a heightened form of rational basis review and in the 
end inappropriately substituted its judgment for that of Congress.130 
Shelby County, of course, is far from the first time Justice Scalia has abandoned 
originalism. His concurrence in Adarand similarly held unconstitutional a federal 
provision designed to benefit racial minorities.131 Although both opinions deviated 
from the originalism generally promoted by the Reagan/Meese agenda, they both 
fulfilled objectives endorsed in that agenda—specifically, the expansion of state 
sovereignty, the diminishment of congressional authority to enact legislation to 
protect the rights of racial minorities, and an end to affirmative action.132 
The failure of originalism’s principal adherents on the Court to employ it in 
Shelby County should undermine any future efforts to limit the constitutional 
guarantees of liberty and equal protection to the specific meanings, understandings, 
and prejudices of 1791 and 1868. Those specific meanings and prejudices, as 1980s 
originalism would have reflected them, plainly would have precluded the 
meaningful constitutional protections the Court has afforded the equal dignity and 
liberty of women and gays and lesbians, back at least half a century to Griswold’s 
recognition of married women’s right to use contraception to avoid and control the 
timing of motherhood. With Windsor and Shelby County, June 2013 marks what 
should prove to be a decisive rejection of narrow originalism and a reaffirmation of 
our nation’s longstanding constitutional commitment to respecting evolving social 
understandings of what constitutes equal protection and liberty for those we once 
marginalized and stereotyped through the force of law. Conversations about 
originalisms, plural, and the ways in which we all may be originalists and living 
constitutionalists will endure, as they should. Notwithstanding continued major 
disagreements on a host of particulars, we seem finally to have progressed beyond 
the originalism of Bowers v. Hardwick, in favor of a lasting embrace of a 
remarkably successful, adaptable, and inclusive Constitution, in Chief Justice 
Marshall’s words, “intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be 
adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”133 
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Conclusion 
I conclude this Essay with another chronology, this one of a personal nature. 
The day after the Court decided Windsor, my sister Jennifer Johnsen celebrated her 
fourth wedding anniversary, and she posted the following on her Facebook page to 
explain the legal trajectory of her relationship with my sister-in-law Dawn 
Guarriello134: 
 We have more anniversaries than most couples, which I know is 
confusing! Here’s the breakdown for those of you who asked: 
 
9/6/86 — started dating  
 
8/10/96  — commitment ceremony (we thought there was a  
    good chance we’d never be able to get married) 
 
6/27/09 — state marriage (in CT because NY wouldn’t   
    perform them but recognized out-of-state same- 
    sex marriages) 
 
9/6/09 — NY wedding with family and friends (we recycled  
    our original anniversary) 
 
And now finally on 6/26/13 we have a legally fully recognized 
marriage135 
As I read this post, I was struck of course by the injustice and personal cost, and 
also by the connections between the personal and the legal. Jennifer and Dawn have 
been together for twenty-seven years, since 1986, coincidentally the year the Court 
held in Bowers that they could constitutionally be imprisoned for their relationship. 
Ten years later, they despaired of ever being able to marry and held a small, 
necessarily unofficial commitment ceremony in my parents’ backyard. That was 
1996, the year Congress enacted DOMA. They married four years ago, in 2009, 
when their home state of New York refused to perform their marriage but would 
recognize an out-of-state marriage. In 2011, New York became the eighth state to 
end marriage discrimination. In 2013, the Court held DOMA unconstitutional and 
their relationship finally is afforded equal legal status. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 134. I thank Jennifer and Dawn for allowing me to share their story, and I dedicate this 
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As of 2013, almost sixty-two percent of Americans live in states that will not 
allow individuals of the same sex to marry, including my state of Indiana, where 
the legislature has passed a proposed amendment to write that discrimination into 
the state constitution, as most states already have. Legislative action in 2014 will 
determine whether the proposed amendment goes to the public in a ballot question. 
“When did it become unconstitutional to exclude homosexuals from marriage?” 
The process toward “a more perfect union” continues.136 
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